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Deborah R. Hensler, Ph.D.t
In policy and scholarly debates over the wisdom of mandating
arbitration for civil lawsuits, discussion usually focuses on differ-
ences between arbitration and trial, and on values that litigants
may forfeit if the court requires them to arbitrate their disputes,
rather than take them to trial. In these debates, critics often view
the requirement that litigants arbitrate as a denial of adjudicatory
process or, at least, as an obstacle to obtaining adjudicated resolu-
tions of disputes. In this Article, I argue, quite to the contrary,
that in many metropolitan courts in the United States today, arbi-
tration is the only adjudicatory mechanism actually available to
most litigants with ordinary civil cases. Because litigants must wait
two, three or even five years for cases to reach trial, and because
many lawyers are unwilling to invest their time in trying smaller
value cases, litigants' real choice in courts that offer arbitration is
between arbitration and settlement. Policymakers and scholars
should, therefore, give more attention to the differences between
these two dispute resolution mechanisms. After carefully consider-
ing the strengths and weaknesses of arbitration and settlement
procedures, I believe that many current critics of arbitration would
conclude that it offers a higher quality of justice than settlement
processes. Moreover, by ensuring easy access to arbitration,
strengthening arbitrator selection procedures, setting standards for
the arbitration hearing process and publicly reporting arbitration
outcomes, courts can further increase arbitration's contributions to
due process.
This Article first describes court-ordered arbitration and dis-
tinguishes it from other dispute resolution procedures. It then
summarizes- the development of court arbitration programs and
places this development within the context of the alternative dis-
pute resolution ("ADR") movement. Next, it reviews policy and
scholarly concerns that have been expressed about the expanding
role of court-mandated arbitration. Drawing on evaluations of arbi-
t Institute for Civil Justice, The RAND Corporation.
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tration programs and procedural justice research, the Article then
details empirical findings on: (1) the consequences of adopting
court-ordered arbitration programs, (2) litigants' standards of due
process, and (3) litigants' assessments of the degree to which vari-
ous court processes-including arbitration-satisfy these stan-
dards. The Article closes with a discussion of the implications of
these findings for legal policymaking.
I. COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION DEFINED'
As the name implies, all court-ordered arbitration programs
involve a mandatory referral of a particular class of civil suits to an
arbitration hearing. Typically, the jurisdiction of such programs is
limited to civil suits for money damages up to a statutorily-defined
monetary limit. Some courts require attorneys to file a form indi-
cating certain characteristics of the case-for example, the amount
of monetary damages the plaintiff seeks. If the form indicates that
the case meets the eligibility requirements, a clerk will refer it to
the program.' In other courts, an administrator or judge will meet
with the attorneys to discuss the case and to determine its eligibil-
ity.3 In still other courts, all cases involving money damages are
assigned to the program and attorneys must petition to remove the
cases that they believe are ineligible."
The court manages the arbitration process, but arbitration
hearings may take place in a variety of settings, including the
courthouse, a special public facility designed for the program or
the offices of attorneys or other private arbitrators. Arbitrators are
typically volunteer lawyers or retired judges whom the court ap-
points and pays a modest honorarium. These arbitrators may sit
singly or in panels of two or three. When panels are used, the court
selects arbitrators who represent the different sectors of the bar
that are typically associated with arbitration-eligible cases-for ex-
ample, the plaintiff and defense personal injury bars.
1 For a discussion of common design features of court-ordered arbitration programs, see
Elizabeth Rolph, Introducing Court-Annexed Arbitration: A Policymaker's Guide 10-30
(RAND Corp., 1984).
Jane Adler, Deborah Hensler and Charles Nelson, Simple Justice: How Litigants
Fare in the Pittsburgh Court Arbitration Program 10 (RAND Corp., 1983).
' Deborah Hensler, Albert Lipson and Elizabeth Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in Cali-
fornia: The First Year 31 (RAND Corp., 1981).
Robert MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication: An Evaluation of the New Jersey
Automobile Arbitration Program 6 (RAND Corp., 1988).
' Rolph, Introducing Court Annexed Arbitration at 20-22 (cited in note 1).
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The parties of record attend the hearings and usually testify.
Hearings are not open to the public. The proceedings are adver-
sarial, but the rules of evidence are relaxed. Witnesses other than
the parties may appear but are not required, and cases may be
decided wholly or partly "on the papers." Parties are usually rep-
resented by counsel. Hearings may be as brief as 30 minutes and
rarely last for more than a few hours. Usually, no record is made of
the hearing. The arbitrators confer and announce their decision
soon after the hearing. If they decide in favor of the plaintiff, they
indicate the amount of money the plaintiff should receive. They
are not required to give their reasons for the decision and generally
do not do so.
The decision rendered by the arbitrators does not bind the
parties. If any party is dissatisfied with the arbitrators' decision,
that party may reject the award by filing an appeal to the trial
court. When this occurs, the case returns to the trial calendar. If
the case does not subsequently settle, the trial is held de
novo-that is, neither the judge nor jury learns the outcome of the
arbitration hearing that preceded it. The jury does not even learn
that an arbitration hearing took place. The judge may infer this
because he or she knows that the court has a mandatory arbitra-
tion program.
In many programs, a litigant who rejects the award must pay a
fee that reimburses the court for all or some of the arbitrators' fees
before the case is returned to the trial calendar. In some jurisdic-
tions, if the party who rejected the arbitrators' decision does not
obtain a better result at trial, that party must pay a penalty.7 Vari-
ous state courts have upheld the constitutionality of such proceed-
ings, but have sometimes set limits on the type or amount of pen-
alties that can be imposed.'
Despite its name, court-ordered arbitration differs signifi-
cantly from the more familiar form of arbitration that occurs in
private fora outside the courts, most often in the context of com-
mercial and labor disputes. The latter form of arbitration produces
a binding outcome that the parties have a contractual obligation to
accept. Court-ordered arbitration also differs significantly from
mediation, another popular dispute resolution approach, where
6 Deborah Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About Court-Administered Arbi-
tration, 69 Judicature 270, 271 (1986).
' Patricia Ebener and Donna Betancourt, Court-Annexed Arbitration: The National
Picture 9-10 (RAND Corp., 1985).
1 Rolph, Introducing Court-Annexed Arbitration at 26-27.
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mediators try to help the parties resolve their dispute but have no
explicit authority to determine the outcome. In contrast, court-
appointed arbitrators hear the dispute, deliberate and then an-
nounce a decision. If neither of the parties vetoes the decision, it is
recorded as a court judgment, and the winning party can call on
the court's authority to enforce it." Court-ordered arbitration may
therefore be termed a quasi-adjudicatory procedure.
II. COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION AND THE ADR MOVEMENT
What we now think of as the alternative dispute resolution
"movement" began in the late 1960s as a populist attempt to re-
turn the dispute resolution process to disputants. Early ADR pro-
ponents championed mechanisms, such as neighborhood justice
centers, that took disputes out of the court. These ADR propo-
nents wanted to substitute mediation, which lets disputants fash-
ion their own solutions to problems, for adjudication, which gives
control of outcomes to neutral third parties. ADR proponents be-
lieved that through these "alternative" processes, disputants would
negotiate outcomes that would be more appropriate to their situa-
tion, more satisfactory, and more likely to contribute to the contin-
uation of long-term relationships than the court process. Some of
these ADR proponents also had a broader objective: they wanted
to shift the locus of political control in society from elite groups,
which in their view governed the courts, to the community at
large.' 0
In the late 1970s, the ADR movement moved into the courts
themselves. Rather than suggesting that disputes be removed from
the courts altogether, proponents of court-based ADR wanted to
divert cases from trial. Although some proponents of court-based
ADR procedures shared the populist ideals of the movement's
founders," most had other objectives in mind. In court settings,
ADR became an efficiency mechanism, designed to speed disposi-
tion and decrease transaction costs by offering a satisfactory sub-
For a discussion of differences between mediation and arbitration, see John Cooley,
Arbitration vs. Mediation-Explaining the Differences, 69 Judicature 263, 263-69 (1986).
10 For an early history of the ADR movement, see Jerold Auerbach, Justice Without
Law? (Oxford Press, 1983). Ironically, as ADR became more successful, some critics charged
that it had become a mechanism for maintaining elite power. See, generally, Richard Abel,
ed, The Politics of Informal Justice: The American Experience (Academic Press, 1982).
" For example, in California, then-Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., originally pro-
posed that attorneys should volunteer their time as arbitrators as a community service. See
Hensler, Lipson & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California at 20 (cited in note 3).
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stitute for trial. 12 If these court reformers had any larger objective,
it was to provide litigants who brought their disputes into court
with a variety of procedural options for resolving their cases. 13 Un-
like the populist reformers, court reformers did not seek to change
either the outcomes of court disputes or the core rules underlying
court dispute resolution.' Nor did they seek to substitute lay deci-
sionmakers for professional legal decisionmakers. 6 Court reform-
ers' enthusiasm for ADR led them to design some procedures that
seemed genuinely new, such as summary jury trials, early neutral
evaluation and minitrials. 8 But, in other instances, procedures
that previously had been considered court management tools, such
as judicial settlement conferences, were now re-conceived as ADR
techniques. 17
Court-ordered arbitration falls into this category of "re-
conceived" procedures. It was first used in 1952, when the Phila-
delphia Court of Common Pleas, under local rule, mandated non-
binding arbitration as an approach to reducing court congestion
and delay. It then spread to other courts in Pennsylvania. 8 By the
1960s, courts in several neighboring states had adopted similar
12 Some arbitration enabling statutes explicitly mention these efficiency goals. See Judi-
cial Arbitration Act, Cal Civ Proc Code § 1141 (West 1982); Compulsory Automobile Liabil-
ity Insurance Act, NJ Stat Ann §§ 39:6A-24 to 39:6A-35 (West 1973).
"3 Frank Sander, Varieties of Dispute Resolution, 70 FRD 111, 114 (1976).
" Rolph, Introducing Court-Annexed Arbitration at 28 (cited in note 1).
1 Hensler, 69 Judicature at 272 (cited in note 6).
10 In summary jury trials, attorneys for each side present the essentials of their case in
much-abbreviated form to selected members of the jury pool. The "jurors" deliberate and
deliver an advisory verdict, which may help to settle the case. Minitrials are also abbrevi-
ated trial proceedings, but are used primarily to resolve corporate disputes outside of court
settings. Rather than trying the case to a mock jury, the attorneys make their arguments to
the principal disputants, in an effort to better acquaint them with their opponents' position,
thereby promoting settlement. Early neutral evaluation programs require parties and their
attorneys to meet with a neutral third party early in the litigation process to identify the
key issues in the cases and formulate a discovery plan. For descriptions of these and other
ADR procedures, see Erika Fine, ed, ADR and the Courts: A Manual for Judges and Law-
yers (Butterworth, 1987); and John Wilkinson, ed, Donovan Leisure Newton and Irvine
ADR Practice Book (Wiley Law Publications, 1990).
" For example, in its draft report, the Federal Courts Study Committee recently wrote:
"The term 'alternative dispute resolution' has come to cover a broad range of approaches to
dispute processing apart from traditional pretrial and trial under courts' general procedural
rules.... The word 'alternative' however, may exaggerate the distance between many ADR
devices and judicial dispute processing, for courts are making increasing use of 'ADR' tech-
niques-and those techniques themselves, such as various forms of judicial involvement in
settlement discussions, often took place before the current movement made people think of
classifying them as 'alternatives.'" Federal Courts Study Committee, Tentative Recommen-
dations for Public Comment 38 (Dec 22, 1989). See also Marc Galanter, The Emergence of
the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 Judicature 256, 258-59 (1986).
"S See Adler, Hensler & Nelson, Simple Justice at 8-9 (cited in note 2).
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programs. Outside the mid-Atlantic region, however, court-ordered
arbitration remained relatively unknown. A second wave of adop-
tion occurred in the early 1970s, again driven by concerns about
court congestion and delay; it was in this period that arbitration
moved into other regions of the country. 9 In 1979, the federal
courts implemented an arbitration experiment in three district
courts: Eastern Pennsylvania, Northern California and Connecti-
cut.2 To date, 20 states (including the District of Columbia) have
implemented mandatory, non-binding, court-ordered arbitration
programs either statewide or in major metropolitan trial courts.2
Ten federal district courts are currently participating in a pilot
mandatory arbitration program that Congress has recently ex-
panded to include an additional ten districts.22 Other state and
federal jurisdictions have adopted voluntary court-administered
programs. Although there is no central registry of such programs,
it seems likely that some form of court arbitration now exists in
several hundred courts nationwide.23
Arbitration program caseloads vary across jurisdictions. A few
programs apply to all civil damage suits, but most have either an
upper dollar limit, a substantive limitation, or both. Although
many programs were initially limited to smaller-value suits, there
has been a tendency to increase monetary limits over time. Today,
seven of the mandatory state programs and all of the federal dis-
trict court programs have limits above $25,000. A number of juris-
dictions arbitrate cases with values up to $150,000.24
III. THE DEBATE OVER COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION
Court-ordered arbitration has not been without its critics. In-
deed, as it has become more popular among judges, administrators
and legislators-as evidenced both by its spread across the country
and by the expansion of jurisdiction for existing pro-
', On the spread of court-ordered arbitration, see Patricia Ebener, Court Efforts to Re-
duce Pretrial Delay 51-52 (RAND Corp., 1981); Ebener & Betancourt, Court-Annexed Ar-
bitration at 5-6 (cited in note 7); Susan Keilitz, Geoff Gallas and Roger Hanson, State
Adoption of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Where Is It Today?, 12 State Ct J 4, 5-11
(1988).
'o E. Allan Lind and John E. Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration in
Three Federal District Courts xi (Federal Judicial Center, revised ed 1983).
" Hensler, 69 Judicature at 271 (cited in note 6), reports 18 states adopted, with 17 in
some stage of implementation. Since 1986, the District of Columbia, Hawaii and Massachu-
setts have implemented court-ordered arbitration programs.
2 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 28 USC § 652 (b)-(d) (1988).
23 Hensler, 69 Judicature at 271.
24 Keilitz, Gallas & Hanson, 12 State Ct J at 6-7 (cited in note 19).
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grams-scholars have become more concerned about its conse-
quences. Although many of these critics are apparently willing to
believe that court-ordered arbitration will prove more efficient
than the traditional court process, these scholars reject the notion
that such efficiencies can be obtained without impairing the qual-
ity of justice.2"
In brief, some legal scholars have criticized court-ordered arbi-
tration because they believe that since it Omits the procedural pro-
tections of the trial process-openness to the public, formality of
setting, deliberativeness, opportunity to cross-examine witnesses,
assurance that a record is kept and the presence of judge and jury,
it cannot and does not provide due process. Moreover, some schol-
ars are concerned that reliance on arbitration will reduce the num-
ber of opportunities for judges and juries to articulate normative
standards. Unlike the trial process, these scholars say, arbitration
sets no precedents. Even if it serves individual litigants well, these
critics fear that reliance on arbitration will impair the public di-
mension of the civil justice system.2 6 Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, scholars fear that over the long run, promoting court-
ordered arbitration to dispose of the bulk of civil disputes-even if
there is a formal option of rejecting an award and going to
trial-will lead to the withering away of the trial process, which
they view as an important political institution.
Of course, scholars are not the only critics of court-ordered ar-
bitration. When states first began to adopt court-ordered arbitra-
tion, some judges viewed it as an inappropriate intrusion into their
sphere of authority." Some practitioners were concerned that it
would produce less satisfactory outcomes for their clients than the
traditional settlement-or-trial process. 8 But as concerns about
court congestion and delay have mounted, the view that significant
procedural changes are necessary to combat court overload has
prevailed, and court-based ADR procedures have proliferated.
25 Professor Wood discusses these concerns in her article in this volume. Diane P.
Wood, Court-Annexed Arbitration: The Wrong Cure, 1990 U Chi Legal F 421. Concerns
about the trade-offs between efficiency and quality extend beyond court-administered arbi-
tration. See, for example, Marc Galanter, Compared to What? Assessing the Quality of Dis-
pute Processing, 66 Denver U L Rev xii (1989); Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L J
1073, 1085-86 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and
Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L Rev 485, 487 (1985).
26 Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U Fla L Rev 405, 424-25 (1987).
For example, California state judges initially opposed the adoption of a court-ordered
arbitration program. See Hensler, Lipson & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California at 9
(cited in note 3).
28 Hensler, 69 Judicature at 275, 278 (cited in note 6).
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Nevertheless, some judges and practitioners remain troubled about
the effects of court-ordered arbitration and other court-based ADR
procedures on due process.2 9
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF
COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION
Court-ordered arbitration is unique among ADR mechanisms
in that it has been subjected to systematic empirical study by
scholars at multiple institutions for more than a decade. Research-
ers have examined a variety of state and federal court-ordered ar-
bitration programs operating for varying lengths of time in differ-
ent regions of the country. These studies include examinations of
the legislative records associated with arbitration-enabling statutes
in order to identify the objectives of programs, 0 analyses of aggre-
gate and case-level program statistics in order to measure program
effects on court caseloads, costs and time to disposition,31 and
surveys of attorneys and litigants, in order to determine program
impact on private litigation costs and attitudes towards the arbi-
tration process and its outcomes.2
Like policymakers and scholars, researchers began their stud-
ies by focusing on the differences between arbitration and trial.3
Not too surprisingly, these analysts found that arbitration hearings
were, on average, shorter than trials, involved less attorney prepa-
ration time than trial, cost both courts and private litigants less
than trials, and generally required less time in the schedule queue
29 H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed is Justice Ruined, 38 Rutgers L Rev 431, 437 (1986).
'0 See, for example, Hensler, Lipson & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California at 13-
23 (cited in note 3).
See, generally, Hensler, Lipson & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California at 24-84;
Adler, Hensler & Nelson, Simple Justice at 55 (cited in note 2); Lind & Shapard, Evalua-
tion of Court-Annexed Arbitration in Three Federal District Courts at 25-72 (cited in note
20); David Bryant, Judicial Arbitration in California: An Update 20-38 (RAND Corp.,
1989); Stevens Clarke, Laura Donnelly and Sara Grove, Court-Ordered Arbitration in North
Carolina: An Evaluation of its Effects (University of North Carolina, 1989).
32 Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration in Three Federal Dis-
trict Courts at 56-69 (cited in note 20); Adler, Hensler & Nelson, Simple Justice at 60-85
(cited in note 2); Clarke, Donnelly & Grove, Court-Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina
at 53-76 (cited in note 31); E. Allan Lind, et al, The Perception of Justice: Tort Litigants'
Views of Trial, Court-Annexed Arbitration, and Judicial Settlement Conferences vii-viii
(RAND Corp., 1989); E. Allan Lind, Arbitrating High-Stakes Cases: An Evaluation of
Court-Annexed Arbitration in a United States District Court (RAND Corp., 1990).
" See, generally, Hensler, Lipson & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California (cited in
note 3); Adler, Hensler & Nelson, Simple Justice (cited in note 2).
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than trials."' But researchers soon realized that simply comparing
the arbitration process with trial was inadequate for determining
the consequences of court-ordered arbitration programs. In most
metropolitan state courts and federal district courts today, no
more than ten percent of tort and contract suits are tried. 5 There-
fore, to understand the consequences of court-ordered arbitration,
one needs to examine its impact on the entire litigation process,
including, most importantly, settlement behavior. To do this, the
analyst has several options: compare litigation patterns in similar
courts with court-ordered arbitration programs to litigation pat-
terns in courts without such programs; compare litigation patterns
in a single court before and after it adopts an arbitration program;
or, using an experimental design in which a court randomly selects
some cases for arbitration, compare the outcomes of cases assigned
to arbitration to the outcomes of a control group of cases that re-
main on the traditional trial track. All three approaches have been
used to study court-ordered arbitration."6
The results of these analyses have proven surprising to some.
Contrary to what many supporters and opponents of arbitration
expected, court-ordered arbitration produces mixed results with
regard to efficiency. Litigants and lawyers alike give arbitration
high marks for fairness, however, both with regard to the hearing
process and the ultimate outcome. The reason why court-ordered
arbitration has confounded supporters and critics alike is that, in
most instances, the arbitration process does not divert cases from
trial, but rather provides an alternative to a settlement reached
without hearing. In courts that require arbitration as a precondi-
tion for trial, one-third to one-half of the cases that are referred to
arbitration actually go to hearing. 7 As a consequence, two to ten
times as many civil cases receive some form of adjudicative process
in courts that have mandatory arbitration programs, as compared
" Hensler, 69 Judicature 270 (cited in note 6), reviews these findings, which are dis-
cussed in more detail below.
" Terence Dungworth, Statistical Overview of Civil Litigation in the Federal Courts
28-29 (RAND Corp., 1990).
8 The experimental design is the most rigorous approach. It provides the strongest
basis for statistical inference. But it is also difficult to use in a court setting. See Federal
Judicial Center Advisory Committee on Experimentation in the Law, Experimentation in
the Law (Federal Judicial Center, 1981).
37 Hensler, Lipson & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California at 46 (cited in note 3);
MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 33 (cited in note 4); Bryant, Judicial Arbitra-
tion in California at 34 (cited in note 31); Clarke, Donnelly & Grove, Court-Ordered Arbi-
tration in North Carolina at 26 (cited in note 31).
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to courts that do not.8 In sum, rather than diverting cases from
adjudication, arbitration provides an alternative form of adjudica-
tion to many cases that would not otherwise be heard.
A. Effects on Trial Rates
The primary objective of court-ordered arbitration is to divert
cases from trial-the key to saving time and money for courts and
private litigants alike. But most court-ordered arbitration pro-
grams do not significantly reduce the number or the rate of trials. 9
Since most arbitration programs process hundreds or even
thousands of cases, and most studies have found that few of the
cases assigned to arbitration ever reach trial,4 ° many court admin-
istrators and practitioners in jurisdictions with court-ordered arbi-
tration programs believe that arbitration must be substantially re-
ducing the numbers of cases tried.4 But in many metropolitan
courts, trial rates for the kinds of cases that are typically assigned
to court-ordered arbitration programs were already in the two to
three percent range prior to the inception of arbitration. After ar-
bitration is put in place, the trial rate for these same cases remains
about two to three percent. In other words, even though the vast
number of arbitration-eligible cases are not tried, because the par-
ties either settle or accept the arbitrators' award, the arbitration
process appears to have little net effect on the rate at which cases
go to trial.42
'8 MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 33 (cited in note 4); Lind, Arbitrating
High-Stakes Cases at 36 (cited in note 32). Clarke, Donnelly & Grove also conclude that
arbitration diverts cases more from settlement than from trial. Court-Ordered Arbitration
in North Carolina at 78.
", The rate of trial is usually defined either as the total number of tried cases divided
by the total number of cases filed, or the total number of tried cases divided by the total
number of cases answered.
40 Hensler, Lipson & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California at 32-34 (cited in note
3); Adler, Hensler & Nelson, Simple Justice at 47 (cited in note 2); MacCoun, et al, Alter-
native Adjudication at 27 (cited in note 4); Bryant, Judicial Arbitration in California at 23
(cited in note 31); Lind, Arbitrating High-Stakes Cases at 30.
" In my visits to jurisdictions with arbitration programs, I have often been told by
enthusiastic program supporters that arbitration programs are saving hundreds or
thousands of trials. Program observers believe this because they assume that all or most of
the cases processed through arbitration would otherwise have gone to trial. When I point
out that prior to the inception of arbitration, litigants would have settled these cases with-
out trial, these individuals agree that this is true, but are reluctant to accept the implication
that arbitration cannot be reducing the number of trials as substantially as they first
believed.
42 Assessing the statistical significance of differences observed in trial rates and inter-
preting the meaning of significance tests pose problems for arbitration program analysts.
First, the analyst's ability to infer that percentage changes are statistically significant de-
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B. Effects on Court Costs
When court-ordered arbitration has little effect on the number
of cases tried, it has little effect on the caseloads of trial judges.
Since trials account for a large fraction of the public cost of the
court system,"3 court-ordered arbitration does not significantly re-
duce court costs. Moreover, even court-ordered arbitration has its
costs. Programs need to be administered, and the .success of any
court program depends to some extent on the amount of resources
allocated to it." In addition, all court-ordered arbitration programs
provide for arbitrator honoraria. Although the amounts are quite
modest,'5 fee payments for all arbitrated cases can total hundreds
pends on sample size. To be able to infer that very small changes-for example, reductions
in trial rate from three percent to two percent-are significant would require samples of
several thousand cases, which are beyond the resource constraints of most studies. Second,
-the fact that analysts observe differences in trial rates-for example, pre- and post-arbitra-
tion-that are not statistically significant does not mean that arbitration produced no
change, but rather that any change observed may have been a matter of chance. In New
Jersey, MacCoun and his collaborators found that trial rates dropped from three percent
overall before the arbitration program was put in place to 1.5 percent overall after the pro-
gram was put in place. MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 30-33 (cited in note 4).
In the post-arbitration period, however, the trial rate for arbitrated cases was higher (3.66
percent) than the trial rate for cases that were ineligible for arbitration (2.86 percent). Id.
This suggests that there may have been a general downward trend in trial rates in New
Jersey from 1983 to 1985, but that arbitration may actually have contributed to increasing
trial rates somewhat. But none of these differences were large enough to be judged statisti-
cally significant. Id.
In California, Bryant found no difference in trial rates, but his data were more qualita-
tive. Bryant, Judicial Arbitration in California at 23 (cited in note 31).
In the Los Angeles Superior Court, Kakalik and his collaborators found a trial rate of
2.8 percent among arbitrated cases, compared to one percent among all motor vehicle per-
sonal injury cases, two percent among all other personal injury cases, and four percent
among all contract disputes. James Kakalik, Molly Selvin and Nicholas Pace, Averting
Gridlock: Strategies for Reducing Civil Delay in Los Angeles Superior Court (forthcoming).
They conclude that arbitration does not appear to have a significant effect on trial rates. Id.
In the Middle District of North Carolina, Lind found a trial rate of 4.1 percent among
cases that had been randomly assigned to arbitration, compared to a rate of 5.5 percent
among "control" cases. Lind, Arbitrating High-Stakes Cases at 39 (cited in note 32). But
this difference was not statistically significant. However, Clarke, Donnelly and Grove report
a statistically significant decrease of nine percent in the trial rate resulting from arbitration
in North Carolina's state program, suggesting that arbitration may sometimes decrease trial
rates. Court-Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina at 48-49 (cited in note 31).
41 J.S. Kakalik and R.L. Ross, Costs of the Civil Justice System: Court Expenditures
for Various Types of Civil Cases xi (RAND Corp., 1983).
4' For a discussion of the role of resources in implementation success, see Hensler, Lip-
son & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California at 94-96 (cited in note 3).
46 Some jurisdictions pay on a daily basis, others on a per case basis. Rolph reports fees
in jurisdictions that pay on a daily basis running from about $25 to $30 per hour. Rolph,
Introducing Court-Annexed Arbitration at 29 (cited in note 1). In California, the fee is $150
per case. Bryant, Judicial Arbitration in California at 27 (cited in note 31). In New Jersey,
the fee is $250 per case. MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 5 (cited in note 4).
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of thousands of dollars." As a result, court-ordered arbitration
programs may not decrease overall costs even when, or if, they
achieve some reductions in the total number of trials in a jurisdic-
tion: the savings accrued from eliminating a few trials are out-
weighed by the costs of processing a large number of cases through
the alternative program.47
C. Effects on Time to Disposition
A primary objective of court-ordered arbitration programs is
to reduce time to disposition. A number of factors influence a pro-
gram's ability to achieve this goal, including the court's scheduling
rules and procedures and the effect of arbitration on settlement
behavior. As a result, arbitration speeds disposition in some courts,
has little or no effect on time to disposition in others, and may
actually lengthen the disposition process in certain jurisdictions.
Some courts do not determine eligibility for arbitration until
they have held a pretrial conference, scheduled shortly before the
trial date. In a court where the interval between filing and trial is
relatively short, this approach is cost efficient: a judge will only
have to review those cases that the attorneys have been unable to
settle prior to the conference. On the other hand, if there is a
lengthy wait for a trial date, there will be almost as long a wait for
an arbitration hearing date, and arbitration will not significantly
expedite disposition."' Most courts, therefore, adopt special proce-
dures to identify and expedite arbitration-eligible cases. For exam-
ple, in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, the court requires plain-
tiffs' attorneys to certify whether cases are eligible for arbitration
at the time they file the complaints. If a case is certified as eligible,
the court sends notification of the hearing date (three months from
the filing date) to defendants with the notification that a suit has
been filed against them.49 In North Carolina's pilot program, the
court automatically schedules eligible cases for an arbitration hear-
ing 60 days after the answer is filed."
Arbitration rules often specify certain time periods from case-
filing to hearing in order to permit, for example, the defendant to
" For example, Bryant reports that California spent more than $2.2 million in arbitra-
tors' fees in fiscal 1985-86. Bryant, Judicial Arbitration in California at 25.
41 Hensler, Lipson & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California at 39-44 (cited in note
3), review the arithmetic behind this observation.
48 Id at 75-80.
49 Adler, Hensler & Nelson, Simple Justice at 9-12 (cited in note 2).




answer the plaintiff's complaint, or the parties to exchange discov-
ery materials.5 1 In California, strict adherence to such time limits
would allow cases to reach an arbitration hearing within seven
months of filing;52 in New Jersey, which operates under somewhat
different rules, cases would reach an arbitration hearing within
about five months. 3 But some courts have difficulty meeting these
time deadlines. 54 Despite the constraints that scheduling rules and
practices impose, in most instances parties wait less time to reach
an arbitration hearing than they would have to wait for a trial date
in their jurisdiction. 5 As a result, practitioners and administrators
may believe that court-ordered arbitration is reducing average time
to disposition. Again, empirical analyses sometimes point to a con-
trary conclusion. For example, in New Jersey, MacCoun found that
the introduction of the arbitration program increased average time
to disposition by about one-third.56 In Rochester, Weller, Ruhnka
and Martin found that arbitration had no significant effect on av-
erage time from filing to final disposition.57 In three federal district
courts that experimented with court-ordered arbitration in the late
1970s, Lind and Shapard found that the program reduced average
time to disposition in two courts but had no measurable effect on
time to disposition in a third.5 8 In a more recent study of the Mid-
dle District of North Carolina, Lind found that cases randomly as-
signed to arbitration took about the same time, on average, to
reach disposition as comparable non-arbitration cases. 9
What explains the results of the studies detailed above? Re-
searchers find that, absent arbitration, there are several different
points in the litigation process at which litigants are likely to re-
" Rolph, Introducing Court-Annexed Arbitration at 19-20 (cited in note 1).
" Bryant, Judicial Arbitration in California at 21 (cited in note 31).
16 MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 37 (cited in note 4).
64 Hensler, Lipson & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California at 76 (cited in note 3);
MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 37 (cited in note 4).
55 See, for example, Bryant, Judicial Arbitration in California at 22 (cited in note 31).
But in the early years of California's court-ordered arbitration program, the arbitration pro-
cess actually took longer than the trial process in some courts. See Hensler, Lipson & Rolph,
Judicial Arbitration in California at 74.
66 MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 35-37.
'7 Steven Weller, John Ruhnka and John Martin, Compulsory Civil Arbitration: The
Rochester Answer to Court Backlogs, 20 Judges J 36, 43 (1981).
68 Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration in Three Federal Dis-
trict Courts at 45-52 (cited in note 20).
66 Lind, Arbitrating High-Stakes Cases at 41 (cited in note 32).
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solve their cases.6 0 Some cases are disposed of immediately after
the plaintiff files a complaint, and before the defendant ever files
an answer. 1 In state courts, the proportion of disposed cases in
which there is no record of a defendant's answer is quite high, as
much as 40 to 50 percent in some jurisdictions.62 Among cases in
which defendants do file answers, some cases settle soon after the
answer is filed. The remainder of the cases may linger in the litiga-
tion process for some months or even years, depending on how long
it takes for litigants to receive a trial date. During this time the
lawyers may conduct their discovery, or they may simply shelve
the cases until they hear from the court. Typically, another spurt
of settlement activity occurs a short time before the pretrial con-
ference and a final spurt occurs just prior to trial-the proverbial
settlement "on the courthouse steps."
When arbitration is implemented in a court where the resolu-
tion process fits the description above, it appears to change the
incentives that the parties would otherwise have to settle early in
the litigation process. A change in incentives is particularly likely
if the arbitration program offers a hearing date within months of
filing in a court in which litigants would otherwise have to wait
years for trial--precisely the sort of court that has been most eager
to adopt arbitration. After arbitration is adopted, defendants tend
to answer and await the arbitrators' suggestion regarding the
proper value of the case, rather than settle without even bothering
to file an answer. Plaintiffs faced with recalcitrant defendants are
less ready to drop a case, knowing they can obtain a hearing in a
relatively short time without great expense. 3 Similarly, once a case
is joined, both parties have an interest in waiting relatively few
months to hear what the arbitrators feel the case is worth before
60 Kakalik, Selvin & Pace, Averting Gridlock (cited in note 42), map the process of case
resolution in the Los Angeles Superior Court, showing the proportions of cases resolved at
different stages of the litigation process.
Presumably, plaintiffs drop some of these cases, while in others they reach a settle-
ment with defendants. If the defendant does not answer, courts rarely will have any record
of the true nature of the disposition.
2 MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 16-17 (cited in note 4); Kakalik, Selvin
& Pace, Averting Gridlock (cited in note 42).
6 In New Jersey, MacCoun and his collaborators reported an increase in the answer
rate from 42 percent before the establishment of arbitration to 56 percent after the program
was put in place. MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 16-17. In the Middle District
of North Carolina, Lind reported an answer rate of 64 percent among contract cases that
were randomly selected for arbitration, compared to 43 percent among contract cases in the
control group. He also found a smaller but nevertheless statistically significant difference in
the answer rate for tort cases. Lind, Arbitrating High-Stakes Cases at 34 (cited in note 32).
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agreeing on a settlement. As I discuss below,"' parties also may
value highly the opportunity to have their cases heard by a third
party, regardless of the outcome. The consequence of this shift in
incentives is that some settlements that otherwise would have oc-
curred very early in the litigation process do not occur until just
before or just after an arbitration hearing."5 Because, as I have
shown, arbitration does not generally reduce trial rates signifi-
cantly, court-ordered arbitration may then have the overall effect
of increasing average time to disposition for the total
caseload-thereby disappointing many of its supporters.
D. Effects on Private Litigation Costs
Not surprisingly, researchers have found large differences be-
tween attorneys' costs to arbitrate cases and attorneys' costs to try
cases. Studies show that, attorneys spend considerably less time
preparing cases for arbitration than they would have spent prepar-
ing them for trial, and that arbitration hearings take less time than
the typical trial. As a result, when attorneys charge by the hour,
their fees for cases resolved through arbitration are substantially
less than their fees for cases they try." But because, as I have
shown, most arbitration-eligible cases would not have been tried
0" See text accompanying note 78.
" MacCoun and his collaborators show just such a shift from early to late settlements
that explains the overall increase in average time to disposition. MacCoun, et al, Alternative
Adjudication at 35-37 (cited in note 4). Although Lind and Shapard did find decreases in
average time to disposition in two of the three federal district courts they studied, their data
also show that in two courts arbitration cases were less likely to settle very early in the
process than comparable non-arbitration cases. Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-An-
nexed Arbitration in Three Federal District Courts at 46, 51 (cited in note 20). Weller,
Ruhnka and Martin found that arbitration did not reduce time to disposition overall, even
though it expedited dispositions after cases were answered, because these gains were out-
weighed by an increase in the time between filing and answer. Weller, Ruhnka & Martin,
Compulsory Civil Arbitration at 43 (cited in note 57). Although Weller and his collaborators
do not discuss .this, the latter increase may have been attributable to a change in early
settlement patterns. Lind reports that there was no statistically significant difference in
time to disposition between arbitration cases and comparable non-arbitration cases in the
Middle District of North Carolina, but he found that non-arbitration cases were more likely
than arbitration cases to reach resolution early in the litigation process. Lind, Arbitrating
High-Stakes Cases at 41 (cited in note 32). Clarke, Donnelly & Grove report a substantial
decrease in time to disposition for both uncontested and contested cases assigned to arbitra-
tion in the North Carolina state arbitration program. Court-Ordered Arbitration in North
Carolina at 35-38 (cited in note 31). By setting cases for hearing relatively early in the
litigation process-60 days after the answer is filed-North Carolina's rules may eliminate
any need for those who would naturally be "early settlers" to change their behavior in order
to get a hearing.
"' Hensler, Lipson & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California at 81-83 (cited in note
3); Adler, Hensler & Nelson, Simple Justice at 37-38 (cited in note 2). Plaintiffs who pay on
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anyway, the key question for litigants remains: Are the costs asso-
ciated with arbitrating cases greater or lesser than the costs associ-
ated with settling cases without arbitration?
Some researchers have found little difference between attor-
neys' hours and fees for arbitrated cases and their hours and fees
for settled cases.67 Because most arbitration-eligible cases are rou-
tine (for example, consumer disputes or "fender-benders"), involve
relatively small sums of money and are not expected to go to
trial,68 attorneys have developed cost-effective routines for prepar-
ing them for settlement negotiations. Arbitration hearings them-
selves appear to require little preparation time. Therefore, defense
attorneys' fees do not vary much depending on whether a case is
settled or arbitrated. On the plaintiff's side, since many of the
cases are tort suits, contingency fee arrangements are common.
There is little evidence that instituting arbitration affects fee
ratios.6 9
If, however, arbitration were to reduce the cost of preparing a
case for settlement, litigants might save money on attorneys' fees.
These savings would be more likely when larger-value, more com-
plex cases are involved because attorneys for these cases have more
discretion with regard to how much total time to invest at different
stages of the litigation process. Arbitration might reduce the total
time spent to prepare such cases if hearings were held relatively
early in the litigation process, if limits were placed on prehearing
discovery activities or if discovery must be completed before hear-
ing." More generally, many observers believe that larger-value
a contingent fee basis, however, will not experience any savings unless the attorney's rate for
arbitrated cases is lower than the rate charged for tried cases.
" For example, in New Jersey, MacCoun and his collaborators found that defense at-
torneys reported a median of 15 billable hours to settle cases, regardless of whether the case
was assigned to arbitration or not. Plaintiffs' attorneys, who charged on a contingent fee
basis, reported a median of 19 hours to settle cases that were assigned to arbitration, com-
pared to 20 hours to settle cases that were not assigned to arbitration. The difference was
not statistically significant. MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 41-42 (cited in note
4).
61 For a description of typical arbitration cases, see Adler, Hensler & Nelson, Simple
Justice at 12-20 (cited in note 2).
'9 In Allegheny County, scholars report that some attorneys who have high-volume ar-
bitration practices charge flat fees of a few hundred dollars. Adler, Hensler & Nelson, Sim-
pie Justice at 38. This practice has not been noted elsewhere.
10 Lind found that litigants' costs were reduced by about 20 percent as a result of the
arbitration program in the Middle District of North Carolina, which fits this characteriza-
tion. Lind, Arbitrating High-Stakes Cases at 38 (cited in note 32). Barkai and Kassebaum
have reported similar results for Hawaii's arbitration program, which also applies to high
value cases and imposes discovery limits. J. Barkai and Gene Kassebaum, "The Impact of
Discovery Limitations on Cost, Satisfaction, and Pace in Court-Annexed Arbitration" (pa-
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cases result in more discovery activities and that lengthy litigation
processes lead to more discovery;"1 if this is true, then any program
that shortens the discovery process, including arbitration, may re-
duce settlement costs.
E. Litigant Satisfaction
When researchers have asked litigants and their attorneys to
evaluate court-ordered arbitration, the responses have been con-
sistently positive, regardless of whether the particular arbitration
program appears to be achieving its efficiency goals. In every juris-
diction studied to date, both plaintiffs and defendants, and their
attorneys, whether winners or losers, said they were highly satisfied
with the arbitration process and its outcome. 72 This result has puz-
zled some observers because it seems inconsistent with the more
objective data on arbitration's effects. For an explanation of this
seeming inconsistency, we turn to research on "procedural justice."
V. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: LITIGANTS' STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS
Procedural justice research began with a series of experiments
conducted on university campuses by John Thibaut and Laurens
Walker to determine what individuals want from dispute resolu-
tion processes. In particular, Thibaut and Walker sought to deter-
mine which attributes of dispute resolution procedures lead indi-
viduals to believe that they have been treated fairly or unfairly. In
recent years, the hypotheses that Thibaut and Walker derived
from their laboratory research have been tested in a variety of real-
per presented at the Annual Meeting, Law and Society Association, June 1988). Clarke,
Donnelly and Grove report cost savings for routine cases. Court-Ordered Arbitration in
North Carolina at 68-69 (cited in note 31). But their data on this point are somewhat un-
clear: attorneys were asked to compare costs for arbitration cases with costs for similar cases
litigated before the arbitration program was established. Id. In responding to the question-
naire, they may have been focusing on the difference between arbitrated and tried cases
rather than the difference between arbitrated cases and cases settled without arbitration.
" For a general discussion of this viewpoint, see Brookings Institution, Justice for All:
Reducing Costs and Delay in Civil Litigation (Brookings Institution, 1989).
" Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration in Three Federal Dis-
trict Courts at 60-62 (cited in note 20); Adler, Hensler & Nelson, Simple Justice at 61-63
(cited in note 2); MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 43; Barkai & Kassebaum,
"The Impact of Discovery Limitations"; Lind, et al, The Perception of Justice at viii-ix
(cited in note 32).
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life settings, including courts.73 This procedural justice research on
the resolution of civil damage suits set out to discover:
(1) whether concerns about procedural values would
prove as important to litigants who had real case out-
comes at stake as they were to individuals who par-
ticipated in laboratory simulations;
(2) which attributes of procedure lead litigants to believe
that they have been treated fairly or unfairly; and
(3) whether objective differences in procedural attributes
of trial, court-ordered arbitration and other court dis-
pute resolution procedures would be reflected in liti-
gants' assessments of the fairness of each procedure.
The research showed that both lay litigants who are relatively
naive about legal procedures and institutional litigants, such as
corporate representatives who have considerable legal experience,
care equally about the attributes of dispute resolution procedures.
Moreover, where real cases and outcomes are at stake, disputants
want from the dispute resolution process exactly what Thibaut and
Walker found their experimental subjects wanted: namely, for
their cases to be heard by a neutral third party in a process over
which they themselves feel they have some control. What lay liti-
gants want most from the dispute resolution process is a hearing,
conducted in a dignified and careful fashion, before an impartial
third party. Contrary to some of the propositions put forward by
ADR enthusiasts, lay litigants do not consistently prefer informal-
ity over formality. Nor do they care, generally, whether hearings
are public or private.74
Institutional litigants share most of these views of the lay liti-
gants, but they have a preference for more formal hearings.7 ' Both
lay and institutional litigants are more likely to believe they have
been treated fairly when their cases receive a hearing, and they are
more likely to express satisfaction with the litigation process when
they believe they have been treated fairly, regardless of whether
they won or lost.
Surveys of litigants whose cases received an arbitration hear-
ing show that court-ordered arbitration satisfies these definitions
" For a review of the extensive experimental and field research on procedural justice,
see E. Allan Lind and Tom Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Plenum
Press, 1988).
" Lind, Arbitrating High-Stakes Cases at 63-64 (cited in note 32). But see also Mac-
Coun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 53-54 (cited in note 4).
" Lind, Arbitrating High-Stakes Cases at 51.
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of procedural justice.7 6 In fact, the desire to be heard perhaps ex-
plains why arbitration sometimes delays case disposition: litigants
apparently are willing to spend a little more time in the litigation
process in order to obtain a hearing for their case, in preference to
settling without any hearing."7 The fact that arbitration provides
easy access to a hearing also explains the high marks arbitration
receives from litigants even when it does not substantially reduce
time to disposition or private costs.7 8 Since trials also provide a
hearing of the case, researchers have found that litigants whose
cases are tried are likewise satisfied and feel they have been
treated fairly. Although some ADR enthusiasts have assumed that
litigants view trials negatively,7 9 empirical researchers have discov-
ered that litigants find trial procedures neither uncomfortable nor
difficult to understand.8
In fact, litigants whose cases have been tried and litigants
whose cases have been arbitrated feel much the same way about
their litigation experiences. The empirical research shows that liti-
gants whose cases are arbitrated are about as likely to feel they
have been treated fairly and to express satisfaction with the litiga-
tion process as litigants whose cases are tried. Both are signifi-
cantly more positive about the litigation process than litigants
whose cases are settled in court-mediated conferences. Litigants
whose cases are settled at such conferences are less likely to believe
the process was fair, dignified or careful, compared to litigants
whose cases are arbitrated or tried.8 1
As with research on the efficiency consequences of arbitration,
research on litigants' perceptions of procedural justice has empha-
sized comparisons between those who have experienced arbitration
and those whose cases were tried. But the finding that litigants
believe that both arbitration and trial are more fair than settle-
ment conferences may be the most significant for legal policymak-
ers, because settlement conferences are by far the most common
ADR procedure in use in state and federal courts today. 2 Al-
" Adler, Hensler & Nelson, Simple Justice at 63-71 (cited in note 2); MacCoun, et al,
Alternative Adjudication at 43.
" MacCoun, et al, Alternative Adjudication at 73.
78 For more on the relationships among perceptions of fairness, costs, time to disposi-
tion and satisfaction, see, generally, Lind, et al, The Perception of Justice (cited in note 32).
71 See, for example, Warren Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 ABA J 274, 274-75
(1982).
b Lind, et al, The-Perception of Justice at 64-65 (cited in note 32).
", Id at 46, 70.
2 Deborah Hensler, Court-Annexed ADR, in John Wilkinson, ed, Donovan Leisure
Newton and Irvine ADR Practice Book 352-54 (Wiley Law Publications, 1990).
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though Resnik, Fiss and others8" have written critically about the
pressures courts apply to settle cases, most scholarly critics of arbi-
tration have not confronted the issue of how arbitration compares
to its most frequent alternative, the judicial settlement conference.
Although arbitration may offer litigants a process with fewer pro-
cedural safeguards than trial, settlement frequently provides no
process at all to the disputants themselves, who are often excluded
entirely from conferences with judges. Settlement conferences are
governed by few if any formal rules. They are typically held out of
the hearing of the disputants themselves and away from the public
view. Moreover, by many reports, settlement conferences are al-
most entirely outcome-driven.84 In my conversations with practi-
tioners in jurisdictions with active settlement conference programs,
I have often heard lawyers object to specific judges' practices with
regard to settlement, but I rarely hear comments suggesting that
these same lawyers are generally uncomfortable with settlement as
a mode of dispute resolution. Procedural justice research suggests
that many lay litigants do not share this comfort.
VI. POLICY AND SCHOLARLY IMPLICATIONS
The empirical research reviewed above suggests that litigants
continue to view trial as a desirable form of dispute resolution.85
But in most large metropolitan jurisdictions today, public re-
sources allocated to courts will allow only a small fraction of civil
disputes actually to be tried.86 Moreover, plaintiffs' attorneys are
reluctant to take smaller-value cases to trial, because their costs
would exceed commonly accepted contingent fee ratios. Thus, al-
though as a matter of law plaintiffs have the right to trial in civil
disputes, as a practical matter, they can exercise this right only
rarely.8 7 Those who believe that access to trial is a critical compo-
nent of due process should view this situation with concern.
Various responses to this situation are possible. First, critics
could press policymakers to provide more funds for the court sys-
tem, new judgeships and the construction of additional courts, per-
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv L Rev 374 (1982); Owen Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 Yale L J 1073 (1984); H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed is Justice Ruined, 38
Rutgers L Rev 431 (1986).
, For a particularly vivid view of outcome-driven settlement negotiations, see Peter
Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts (Belknap Press, 1986).
8 Lind, et al, The Perception of Justice at 70 (cited in note 32).
" For a discussion of the cost of supporting a civil trial system, see Kakalik, Selvin &
Pace, Averting Gridlock at xiv (cited in note 42).
17 Brookings Institution, Justice for All at 5-6 (cited in note 71).
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haps thereby providing the opportunity for more cases to be tried.
However, in the face of increased demands for social welfare pro-
gram funding and continued public resistance to taxation, this
strategy seems unlikely to prove successful.8 Moreover, providing
the funds necessary to increase the number of judges and court-
rooms available to try cases would not solve the problem of the
high private costs of litigation.
A second response would be to implement new legal rules that
would exclude a substantial number of cases from court-for ex-
ample, by eliminating diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts,
by establishing mechanisms to screen out "frivolous" cases, or by
raising filing fees substantially. Those cases that remained in the
system might have greater access to judges. Moreover, there would
be less pressure to settle these cases rather than take them to trial.
For example, the Federal Courts Study Committee recently pro-
posed to further limit access to the federal courts in order to per-
mit judges more time to resolve what committee members seem to
view as more weighty cases.8 9 But raising new barriers to filing
cases is scarcely likely to attract support from those who want to
expand access to the system. In fact, the most common response to
declining access to trials is simply to decry the phenomenon and
call for an end to court-based ADR procedures. Ironically, the crit-
ics have been most successful in opposing procedures, such as arbi-
tration, that have historically required statutory authorization,
while procedures such as settlement that are typically adopted
without such authorization, have expanded virtually unchecked. As
a result, those concerned with due process have foregone opportu-
nities to strengthen procedural safeguards that could be associated.
with formally adopted ADR procedures, while contributing, per-
haps unwittingly, to the expansion of procedures that involve few
formal procedural safeguards.
Rather than opposing arbitration as a matter of principle, I
would like legal scholars to consider how to modify arbitration
rules to strengthen due process. For example, to guard against de-
cisions that disadvantage women and minorities, courts could be
instructed to assure that arbitrators represent the diverse groups
within communities and to publish periodically lists of current ar-
s Kakalik, et al, estimate that it would cost approximately $75 million per year to add
enough judges to the Los Angeles Superior Court system to provide timely trial of civil
disputes. See Kakalik, Selvin & Pace, Averting Gridlock at ix.
11 Federal Courts Study Committee, Tentative Recommendations for Public Comment
7-12 (Dec 22, 1989).
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bitrators for public scrutiny. To guard against awards that system-
atically disadvantage plaintiffs or defendants, courts could also be
instructed to publish statistical data on the distribution of arbitra-
tion awards on a regular basis.9 0 To expand access to arbitration
programs, plaintiffs' attorneys could charge lower fees for taking a
case to arbitration than for taking a case to trial-a practice not
currently uniform in jurisdictions with arbitration programs. These
lower fees might encourage more plaintiffs to take their cases to
hearings, rather than settle them without any court process. More-
over, those who are concerned about the effects of arbitration on
due process might focus more attention on the issue of disincen-
tives for trial de novo. Clearly, as fees and penalties for proceeding
to trial increase, the potential for trials to serve as a corrective
mechanism for arbitration errors will decrease. Finally, those who
want to protect and expand access to courts might oppose a grow-
ing trend to charge litigants a special fee for arbitration hearings. 1
At the same time, I would urge those who are interested in
improving the arbitration process to resist what might otherwise be
their natural impulse: to make arbitration hearings increasingly re-
semble trials. If arbitration required live witnesses and recorded
testimony, if hearings were held in formal settings before specially
qualified third party neutrals, if, in short, arbitration hearings be-
came trials by another name, clearly the private and public cost
differential between arbitration and trial would diminish and con-
gested arbitration calendars might become as common as con-
gested trial calendars. As a result, arbitration might become as in-
accessible to most litigants as trials are today, and a significant
opportunity to offer more litigants an adjudicative process would
be lost.
o In the course of the my research, I have found that many jurisdictions routinely tally
these results for their own purposes.
91 Support for such a fee policy has grown as courts and legislatures have recognized
that they are unlikely to realize cost savings from arbitration. The Michigan mediation pro-
gram, for example, charges parties a $75 fee for an attorney-run settlement conference to
which parties are not invited. K. Shuart, The Wayne County Mediation Program in the
Eastern District of Michigan 6-7 (Federal Judicial Center, 1984). In 1987 in California, the
legislature temporarily withdrew state funding for the program, leading some to suggest that
courts should impose special fees on litigants who sought arbitration hearings. See Bryant,
Judicial Arbitration in California at 2 (cited in note 31).
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